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                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                              
 
                           No. 01-3158 
                                              
 
    NOEL MULLEN, a minor; MICHAEL MULLEN; NAOMI MULLEN, his 
  wife, in their own right and as parents and legal guardians 
  of NOEL MULLEN; RICHARD ALEX, a minor; ROBERT ALEX, a minor; 
  JEROME ALEX; MARY ANN ALEX, his wife, in their own right and 
   as parents and legal guardians of RICHARD ALEX and ROBERT 
     ALEX, minors; LARA WALKER, a minor; MICHAEL WALKER, a 
  minor; LARRY WALKER; JEAN C. WALKER, his wife, in their own 
    right and as legal guardians of LARA WALKER and MICHAEL 
    WALKER, minors; ASHLEY MAIER, a minor; BRENDA MAIER, an 
   adult in her own right and as parent and legal guardian of 
   ASHLEY MAIER; ASHLEY LOWREY, a minor; RONALD LOWREY; WENDY 
    LOWREY, his wife, in their own rights and as parents and 
   legal guardians of ASHLEY LOWREY; CHRISTOPHER TAVORMINA, a 
     minor; KIM TAVORMINA, an adult in her own right and as 
   parent and legal guardian of CHRISTOPHER TAVORMINA; RONELL 
  MURRAY, a minor; MICHAEL MURRAY, SR., REVEREND, an adult in 
    his own right and as parent and legal guardian of RONELL 
                            MURRAY, 
                                 
                                        Appellants 
 
                               v. 
 
  JOHN W. THOMPSON, individually and as Superintendent of the 
    City of Pittsburgh School District and Secretary of the 
      Board of Directors of the City of Pittsburgh School 
  District; RICHARD R. FELLERS, individually and as Executive 
   Director of Business Affairs; ALEX MATTHEWS, individually 
       and as President and member of the Board of Public 
   Education; RANDALL TAYLOR, individually and as First Vice 
     President and member of the Board of Public Education; 
  EVELYN B. NEISER, individually and as Second Vice President 
      and member of the Board of Public Education; MARK A. 
  BRENTLEY, SR., individually and as a Member of the Board of 
   Education; JEAN FINK, individually and as a Member of the 
   Board of Education; DARLENE HARRIS, individually and as a 
     Member of the Board of Education; WILLIAM SCOTT ISLER, 
    individually and as a Member of the Board of Education; 
  MAGGIE SCHMIDT, individually and as a Member of the Board of 
  Education; JEAN E. WOOD, individually and as a Member of the 
     Board of Education; THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
                           PITTSBURGH 
                                 
                                           
                                 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
                  (D.C. Civil  No. 01-cv-01087) 
              District Judge: Hon. Gary L. Lancaster 
                                            
 
 
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                          March 7, 2002 
                                  
           Before: SCIRICA and COWEN,  Circuit Judges,  
   RESTANI*, Judge, United States Court of International Trade 
 
                      (Filed March 25, 2002) 
 
 
                         _______________ 
 
                             OPINION 




                     
*Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International 




COWEN, Circuit Judge 
     In this case, Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their various 
civil rights claims 
which arise out of the closing of numerous public schools in the City of 
Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  Because there is no error in the District Court's 
determination that it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, we will affirm. 
                                I. 
     Plaintiffs are nine students enrolled in the Pittsburgh public 
schools and their 
respective parents.  Defendants are John Thompson, the Superintendent of 
the School 
District of the City of Pittsburgh, and members of the Pittsburgh Board of 
Education.  
Taking, as we must, the Plaintiffs allegations as true, the essential 
facts of this case are as 
follows.  On November 10, 2000, a local Pittsburgh newspaper published a 
story about 24 
schools in the school district listed for closing.  On November 14, 2000, 
the district 
officially announced plans to close eighteen schools.  On November 30, 
2000, the School 
Board held a public meeting and allowed the public to address the fiscal 
year 2001 
budget.  Although the meeting was advertised earlier in a newspaper of 
general 
circulation, the advertisement did not specifically mention the issue of 
school closings.  
Nonetheless, several of the Plaintiffs and others showed up at the meeting 
and voiced 
opinions in opposition to the closings.  Members of the public were 
successful in 
preventing the closing of some schools, but Plaintiffs did not have the 
same success. 
     On December 20, 2000, the School Board cast a 5-4 vote to enact a 
budget for 
fiscal year 2001.  The budget included the closings of eight different 
public schools.  
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the present action to enjoin the School Board 
from closing the 
schools.  Plaintiffs' claims were grounded in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(42 U.S.C.  
1983) and asserted violations of the First Amendment right to petition the 
government for 
redress of grievances and the 14th Amendment's guarantee of due process of 
law.  
Defendants moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District Court 
agreed with 
Defendants and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
holding that the 
actions of the School Board did not run counter to the federal 
Constitution.  This appeal 
followed. 
                               II. 
     Plaintiffs contend that the School Board's decision to close the 
schools before the 
full time provided for in section 7-780 violates the First Amendment's 
language 
guaranteeing the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  More 
specifically, Plaintiffs assert that public pressure was successful in 
preventing the 
closings of some schools.  Thus, had Plaintiffs had more time to speak 
out, they could 
have been successful as well.   
     We are sympathetic to the assertion that Plaintiffs apparently had 
less time than 
mandated by state law (under section 7-780) to voice opinions opposing the 
closings 
before those closings became final.  Nevertheless, we are not persuaded 
that the alleged 
failure to comply with the purely procedural mechanism of section 7-780 
rises to the level 
of a First Amendment violation.  Section 1983 is a critical method for 
vindicating the 
denial of federally guaranteed rights but that statute may not be invoked 
every time local 
officials allegedly act contrary to state or local procedural law.  In our 
view, Plaintiffs' 
complaints are more properly left to the Pennsylvania state courts, which 
may take 
whatever action is permissible under state law to redress the fact that a 
state statute was 
not complied with by local officials.  Indeed, the state courts of 
Pennsylvania have 
redressed violations of section 7-780 in the past.  We express no opinion 
on how such 
state-level litigation should proceed or what ultimate result should be 
reached. 
     Plaintiffs also argue that the premature school closing decision 
violated their 14th 
Amendment due process rights.  We are not convinced.  The District Court 
correctly 
analyzed the substance of this issue and properly concluded that 
Plaintiffs have no 
constitutionally cognizable property or liberty interest in attending the 
individual school 
of their choice.  See Mullen v. Thompson, 155 F. Supp.2d 448, 451-53 (W.D. 
Pa. 2001).  
While Pennsylvania law clearly guarantees an adequate free public 
education generally, 
the contours of that right are not nearly as specific as Plaintiffs here 
contend.  If the 
Defendants had denied Plaintiffs access to any free public education, that 
would be a 
different matter.  However, without a constitutionally recognized property 
or liberty 
interest, there is no need for further inquiry on the due process 
question.  See, e.g., Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-712 (1976). 
                               III.      
     Even if all facts asserted by Plaintiffs are true, there is no 
potential for relief under 
the provisions of 42 U.S.C.  1983 since no violations of the federal 
Constitution have 
occurred.  The District Court was correct to grant Defendants' Motion 
pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) and dismiss the cause of action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.     
     For all of the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court 
entered August 1, 
2001 will be affirmed. 
                     
TO THE CLERK: 
     Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
                              /s/ Robert E. Cowen                           
                              United States Circuit Judge 
